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**AUTHORITY**

**AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980**

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**AD824996**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
APO 96307

AVCA-TG-GC

18 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU:

Commanding General  
1st Logistical Command  
ATTN: AVCA GO-O  
APO 96307

**STATEMENT AS UNCLASSIFIED**

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Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVC-DH  
APO 96307

*Dept. of Army  
Wash D C 20301*

Commanding General  
United States Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP - MH  
APO 96307

*Attn: OT-RD*

TO:

Department of the Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Washington, D.C., 20310

D D C  
**REFINED**  
JAN 15 1968  
**REBULLE**

I. Section 1 - Significant Organizational Activities.

1. Changes within major logistical commands in Vietnam continued throughout the reporting period. A diagram of the organization of this Headquarters at the beginning of the reporting period is attached as Inclosure 1. The first such change to affect this Headquarters was the re-assignment of Transportation Truck Units from the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal Service) to U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon, as directed in General Orders Number 81, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, dated 10 May 1966, attached as Inclosure 2. The second change affecting the command was internal (see Inclosure 3). During the period of 1 June through 20 June the missions of the Port Operations Division, Security Division and the Administrative Division were changed. Specifically, the Port Operations Division was relieved of responsibility of accounting for cargo, that mission being transferred to the newly activated Cargo Accounting Division; the Security Division was redesignated as the Intelligence Branch and assigned to the Plans and Intelligence Division; finally, the Provost Marshal Branch was taken from under control of the Administration Division, redesignated the Port Security Division, and charged with the additional mission of providing physical security to the port complex. The third change occurred on 30 June 1966. On this date, General Orders Number 149, Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, dated 30 June 1966, attached as Inclosure 4, authorized reorganization of this command to

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*Incl 6*

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a Transportation Terminal C under TOE 55-111D with changes. The organization at the end of the reporting period, that of a Terminal "C" plus TD augmentation, is attached as Inclosure 5. The reorganization from a functional staff to a "G" staff is currently in progress and will be completed upon the arrival of additional key officer personnel. Principal staff officers at the end of the reporting period are as follows:

- a. Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command: Colonel Jack C. Fuson, who replaced Colonel Richard W. Aronson on 18 July 1966. Colonel Aronson returned to CONUS shortly thereafter.
- b. Deputy Commander: Presently vacant
- c. Acting Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Colonel E. F. Giles, TC
- d. Acting ACofS, G-1: Major Cleo C. Garrett, AGC.
- e. Acting ACofS, G-2: Major Jerry Easterling, AIS
- f. Acting ACofS, G-3: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Hoy, TC
- g. Acting ACofS, G-4: Major Robert P. Jones, TC
- h. Safety Division: Captain Max Whaley, CMLC
- i. Cargo Accounting Division: Major Joseph G. Farrell, TC
- j. Transportation Division: Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Adams, TC
- k. Operations Division: Lieutenant Colonel James B. Reed, TC
- l. Harborcraft Division: Captain James Izatt, TC
- m. Plans and Training Division: Major Paul W. Bossert, TC
- n. Vessel Supply Office Division: WO1 Delbert J. Osgood
- o. Signal Division: Captain Arthur M. Bridgeforth, SC
- p. Supply Division: Captain Robert N. Fothergill, QMC
- q. Marine Maintenance Division: WO1 Delbert J. Osgood
- r. Equipment Services Division: Captain John R. Thraillkill, TC
- s. Cargo Support Division: Vacant
- t. Adjutant General Division: Major Cleo C. Garrett, AGC
- u. Management Division: Major Dwight S. Schwesig, TC
- v. Security Division: Captain James L. Van Zee, MPC

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- w. Information Division: Captain Robert L. Moran, TC
- x. Headquarters Commandant: Captain Henry Pridgen, TC
- y. Headquarters Company Commander: Captain Norval E. Baird, TC
- z. Chaplain: Major Williams R. Gentry, Chap
- aa. Staff Judge Advocate: Major Frank J. Dorsey, JAGC

2. Operation "MOONLIGHT", the arrival of the final increments of the 25th Infantry Division consisting of the 1st Brigade and supporting elements, was completed during the reporting period. The operation order and After Action Report for the operation are attached as Inclosures 6 and 7 respectively.

3. With the reassignment of the command's truck capability, port clearance was continued primarily through contract with Equipment Incorporated, a division of Sea Land Incorporated. Initially, they provided 1½ ton commercial type stake and platform trucks. In early July, the company received two hundred (200) 10 ton commercial type stake and platform trucks. The following statistics reflect the service rendered by Equipment, Inc.:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
Port clearance (S/T)	67,847	86,656	104,015
Average trips per truck	2	1.7	2
Average load per truck (S/T)	2.7	3.4	4.5
Average daily truck utilization (1½ Ton)	49	107	162
Average daily truck utilization (10 Ton)	0	0	63

Approximately 83% of all cargo received in the port is cleared from the port by truck. The remainder is cleared by barge (16%) or rail (1%). Both the barge and rail capabilities are limited due to the limited amount of equipment and the lack of off-loading facilities at the consignees' locations.

4. During the reporting period, the 4th Transportation Command received the additional mission of responsibility for and control of all U.S. Agency for International Development/Central Procurement Agency (USAID/CPA) cargo operations within the Saigon Area. A USAID cargo branch (since redesignated Area II) was organized during the period 27 June 1966 - 1 July 1966 and was placed under the supervisory control of the Operations Division, ACofS, G-3. Becoming operational on 4 July 1966, the new branch assumed responsibility for coordinating and supervising the discharge, port clearance and first destination delivery of the USAID financed CPA cargo. The mission has since expanded to include most areas of USAID cargo and United States Government non-military cargo in commercial warehouses in the port area. The expanded mission also includes initiating appropriate measures to expedite clearance of the cargo from the port.

5. During the reporting period, the command discharged and cleared 581,661 short tons of cargo through the port facilities operated at Saigon Port, Nha Be, Vung Tau and the barge discharge sites at Buu Long, Cogido, Thanh Tuy Ha, Cau Binhh Loi, Binh Trieu and Thu Duc. The barge sites at Buu Long and Cogido are

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presently undergoing repairs in order to increase their capacity. During the month of June the barge site at Thu Duc became operational. During the months to come the Command's capability will further increase as barge sites at New Port and Long Binh become operational; co-located at New-Port will also be four deep draft berths, an LCU/M landing area and two LST piers.

6. During the month of June one LCU from this command was attached to the First Infantry Division for support in Operation Lexington. The vessel's mission was that of transporting troops and supplies from Vung Tau into the delta area. Use of an LCU type craft was highly successful due to the characteristics of the vessel.

7. During the reporting period, two (2) LCUs and six (6) small tugs (45') were received from Korea. When these vessels arrived they were in a stripped condition with little or no "on board spares". Inventories were taken to determine the exact shortages in order to submit the necessary requisitions. The Director of Maintenance, 1st Logistical Command, was notified of this short-coming.

8. Also during the reporting period, the command had the 92d Military Police Battalion Headquarters, the 300th Military Police Company and 33 enlisted men from the 557th Military Police Company available for employment by the PM of this command to provide additional physical security to the port and cargo moving o consignees. Further, an MTOE has been submitted through channels requesting additional men and patrol boats to enhance the physical security posture of the command.

## II. Section 2 - Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

### a. Part I - Observations (Lessons Learned):

#### (1) Lessons Learned - Personnel:

(a) Item: Neither local national nor U.S. military cargo checkers have a basic understanding of the MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP procedures.

1. DISCUSSION: Cargo shipped from the pier is frequently misrouted and/or frustrated due to lack of knowledge of the fundamentals of the MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP regulations (e.g.: construction of TCNs) on the part of either local, national or U.S. military cargo checkers. This doubles the work placed on operations personnel who have the requisite knowledge.

2. OBSERVATION: That prior to being assigned duties as a cargo checker, individuals be required to attend formal instruction on MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP procedures in order to insure their proficiency and eliminate faulty TCMs and misrouting of cargo.

(b) Item: Local national MHE operators are frequently found to be unskilled and undependable.

1. DISCUSSION: It is observed that local national MHE operators frequently lack the required knowledge and skill necessary to operate MHE (e.g.: forklifts) without damage to cargo and loss of time. On occasion

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they have failed to even report for work and are often found asleep on their equipment. This results in much lost time and severe damage to cargo when skilled MHE operators are greatly needed and cargo is fragile.

2. OBSERVATION: That local national MHE operators be thoroughly tested prior to hiring and that either they be subject to dismissal when found sleeping, failing to report for work or operating MHE in an unsatisfactory manner or that U.S. military MHE operators be assigned to supplement the local national operators.

## (2) Lesson Learned - Operations:

(a) Item: There still exists a need for additional lighting on the piers, in the warehouses and around the perimeter.

1. DISCUSSION: There are still a considerable number of items being stolen at night because much of the quay is in darkness. The installation of lights would reduce the opportunity for the workers, under the cover of darkness, to break in and steal cargo that is shipped in boxes and crates. It would also reduce the opportunity for unauthorized personnel to enter the port over the walls.

2. OBSERVATION: Every effort should be made to obtain and install adequate lighting to reduce pilfering and unauthorized entry into the port.

(b) Item: Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) vessels arrive with relatively secure trailers and vans loaded with items of marginal value while security items are shipped in highly pilferable vessels.

1. DISCUSSION: Trailers and vans discharged from RO/RO vessels are relatively secure due to the fact that they may be sent directly to the consignee without intermediate handling by stevedore gangs. However, such trailers and vans are often found to be loaded with nonsensitive items such as toilet paper, sandbags and wooden pallets while such items as whiskey, beer, cameras and other security cargo are shipped "loose" in other vessels and are therefore subject to pilferage during discharge.

2. OBSERVATION: That RO/RO trailers and vans be loaded whenever possible with security cargo to reduce loss of such cargo through pilferage.

(c) Item: Barges and other lighterage arrive at discharge sites without accompanying TCMDs or other documentation.

1. DISCUSSION: Numerous barges and LCUs have arrived at discharge sites without accompanying documentation of any kind. This produces

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confusion as to the nature of the contents and the amount of cargo which should be on the lighter. This situation further prevents an accurate assessment of damage or pilferage to the cargo.

2. OBSERVATION: That activities loading barges or LCUs prepare adequate documentation at time of loading and that such documentation either be affixed to the cargo in an obvious place and in a secure manner or delivered by the master of the lighter, whichever is applicable. This will facilitate estimation of required discharge time and eliminate confusion over the nature and condition of cargo in the lighterage.

(d) Item: Clearing of cargo from commercial warehouses was a time consuming and slow process.

1. DISCUSSION: The USAID Cargo Branch (since redesignated Area II) was formed 4 July 1966. At that time the Warehouse and Storage Section was given the mission of clearing the "backlog" of USAID/CPA cargo from the commercial warehouses. The system proved difficult due to the fact that the Central Procurement Agency (CPA) furnished the paperwork (customs clearance, fees, etc.). Their procedures were very slow and the cargo could not be moved until the paper work was completed. On 20 July 1966, a new agreement was reached with the Vietnamese Customs Officials. This agreement stated that all cargo would be listed on a TCMD. The TCMD would be brought to the Customs Office and a determination would be made at that time whether the cargo could be shipped to consignee or moved to the military controlled Warehouse 10.

2. OBSERVATION: The above system was a substantial improvement over the old. It did not, however, eliminate the slow processes of CPA paperwork. All cargo moved to Warehouse 10 would still have to be cleared by CPA. Some arrangements still must be made to expedite the clearance of the backlog.

(e) Item: Vessels containing chill and freeze cargo require special handling and vehicle requirements.

1. DISCUSSION: Chill and freeze cargo is block-stowed in the hatches of the vessel. The cargo must be palletized in the hold and brought out with the use of nets. The cargo must then be restowed from the pallet to the bed of the vehicle. Once loaded, the cargo must be covered with a tarp to prevent spoilage in transit to the consignee. It has been found that a landing platform, placed directly beneath the hook on the pier, greatly expedites the discharge. The pallet is landed on the platform and the stevedores then block-stow from the same height as the truck bed, thereby reducing handling time in the loading. Additionally, it has been found that the Vietnamese stevedores are inadequately clothed and equipped to work in the hatches of a refrigerater ship. The result has been that refrigerater hatches require much closer supervision by military personnel than those containing other cargo.

2. OBSERVATION: That ships carrying refrigerated cargo require advance preparation of loading platforms, pallets and vehicles. Additionally, closer supervision is required for these ships.

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(f) Item: The advance summaries and stow plans are frequently found to be incomplete or in error.

1. DISCUSSION: Area personnel must rely upon information contained in the ship's summary to effect necessary planning and coordination prior to arrival of the vessel. Often these summaries are inaccurate to the point that considerable delay is encountered after the vessel berths (i.e.: heavy lifts were not indicated in the summary.)

2. OBSERVATION: That increased attention be directed toward securing accurate information from Ports of Exit concerning the nature of the vessel's cargo and discharge capacity, (i.e.: self-sustaining or not self-sustaining in relation to the cargo aboard).

(g) Item: The handling of USAID cargo by the U.S. Army is hampered by the inability of the consignee to receive.

1. DISCUSSION: The consignee is normally not able to receive cargo as rapidly as cargo can be delivered. Contributing to this problem is the limited off-loaded capability of the storage locations, particularly for heavy cargo, and the operational hours that presently exist. The consignees are normally open from 0800-1200 hours and 1430-1800 hours daily.

2. OBSERVATION: These difficulties will eventually be overcome. For the present, when a consignee is to receive a great amount of cargo, USAID personnel attempt to redistribute MHE so that delivery of the cargo can be expedited.

(h) Item: The port was denied forty to fifty Sea Land trucks for approximately 2 hours per shift due to inadequate gas dispensing equipment, i.e.: one 1200 gallon tanker.

1. DISCUSSION: From approximately 25 June to 10 July, Sea Land trucks were refueled by a 1200 gallon tanker furnished by the 48th Transportation Group. The tanker proved unsatisfactory because of the limited capacity and the time lost in transit (vehicle picked up a load of gas in Long Bien). The result was a temporary loss of trucks (40-50) for port clearance.

2. OBSERVATION: The Contracting Officer's Representative (Captain Bulley, 48th Transportation Group) initiated action through US Army Support Command, Saigon, to obtain a 5000 gallon semi-trailer. This trailer, with its greater capacity, has alleviated the problem but has not solved it completely. Sea Land continues to experience difficulty in refueling its vehicles because of vehicle congestion in the current motor park. When the permanent terminal (vicinity Thu Duc) is opened on or about 7 August, this problem should be solved.

(i) Item: Trucks were departing the port area without documentation.

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1. DISCUSSION: It was found that operating procedures allowed RMK and ARVN vehicles to depart the port without documentation for cargo received for at the hook by the consignee. This confused the gate checker on the requirements for documentation. Now all vehicles removing cargo have documentation.

2. OBSERVATION: Documentation system must be consistent throughout or they confuse the personnel who must perform the documentation and physical security functions.

(j) Item: Manual tracing, using TCMDs that carry multiple lines, has an inherent fault.

1. DISCUSSION: The header of a multiple line TCMD carries the TCN of the line with the shortest Required Delivery Date (RDD). When filing these TCMDs in a TCN tracer file, the other lines will be lost because the TCMD will be filed by the header TCN.

2. OBSERVATION: Dummy TCMDs must be created for the other lines on the multiple line TCMD. These can then be filed with reference back to the original header TCN.

## (3) Lessons Learned - Training and Organization:

Item: AR 55-174 prescribes policies, responsibilities and procedures governing the disposition of equipment and materials used in securing cargo in vessels by U.S. Army Transportation Terminals in CONUS and overseas areas.

(a) DISCUSSION: A survey of procedures used in the Dunnage Yard revealed no records of accountability IAW AR 55-174 for cargo lashing and securing material received, used or returned to CONUS. Personnel operating the Dunnage Yard for the Operations Division were neither familiar with the regulation's requirements nor qualified by MOS or training to establish and maintain the records required.

(b) OBSERVATION: The functions required were similar to those performed in the Supply Branch of the Supply, Services and Maintenance Division. Therefore the responsibility for operation and staff supervision of the Dunnage Yard was transferred from the Operations Division to the SS&M Division.

## (4) Lessons Learned - Logistics and Maintenance:

(a) Item: There exists an acute shortage of river patrol boats to be utilized for Port Security.

1. DISCUSSION: This headquarters is performing the port security mission with four patrol boats: two in Saigon and two in Nha Be. The

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18 August 1966

Port Security mission requires a total of thirty-nine (39) boats operating from Vung Tau to Buu Long. In order to perform the assigned mission of port security, additional boats, marine maintenance and crews must be provided as soon as possible.

2. OBSERVATION: Every effort is being made at this level to obtain required patrol craft. Additional command emphasis must be made or this mission cannot adequately be accomplished.

(b) Item: Civilian marine contract maintenance is barely adequate.

1. DISCUSSION: Contract maintenance requires a long lead time. This is caused by the time required for contract specifications and waiting for the actual repairs. Once the work starts the repairs proceed at a very slow pace until completion.

2. OBSERVATION: The present system of part military and part Vietnamese civilian marine maintenance support is working well. The vessel maintenance officer plus a twelve (12) man maintenance team allows for a reduction in contract maintenance and a shorter amount of deadline time per vessel.

(c) Item: Baker 4000 lb electric forklifts FSN 3930-709-6358 deteriorate rapidly if stored outside.

1. DISCUSSION: Baker electric forklifts received recently were rusty to the extent that an excessive amount of time was required for processing. Hand brake drums and wheel brakes were rusted and frozen in place. Also electrical contacts were deteriorated and hand controls were inoperative. When lifts are operated daily rust does not appear to be a problem. Lifts are becoming rusty while in shipment or in storage prior to issue.

2. OBSERVATION: That a concerted effort be made by storage activities to protect electric forklifts as soon as possible from the elements; and, that the manufacturer be advised of this problem and his shipment configuration, lubrication, and protection criteria be changed to facilitate temporary storage of electric forklifts without excessive deterioration.

(d) Item: 12 volt electrical system on LCPLs.

1. DISCUSSION: The five LCPLs assigned to this command for Saigon Harbor and River patrol are equipped with 12 volt D.C. electrical systems. This command uses AN-VRC/10 radios which require a 24 volt D.C. input for communications on patrol boats. To convert the vessel's power supply completely to 24 volts would require changing the generator, regulator, starting motor, compass motor, wiper motor, horn and lighting. With a present density of five LCPLs and more due in, this would involve a large monetary and man-hour expenditure.

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2. OBSERVATION: That in order to provide a 24 volt D.C. power source for radio operation on LCPLs, a separate engine driven 24 volt generator, with regulator, should be installed aboard each craft to provide charging current for a 24 volt battery used exclusively as a radio power supply.

(e) Item: Marine Maintenance Contract

1. DISCUSSION: On or about 1 May 1966 a purchase Request and Commitment, DA Form 14-115, was initiated requesting a marine maintenance contract to provide support for this command. There is a very limited military marine maintenance capability available in the Saigon Area. Owing to the high deadline rate of harborcraft individual Purchase Requests were initiated and individual contracts or purchase orders were let for the repair of individual vessels. As of this date the execution of the marine maintenance contract requested 1 May 1966 is at least sixty (60) days away due to the lack of accurate in-country marine maintenance capability information.

2. OBSERVATION: Advance planning for maintenance support for Saigon Army Terminal harborcraft would have shown the need for a marine maintenance contract. Accurately evaluating military maintenance capability would have established the scope of the work required and reduced the lead time for such a contract considerably. This would also have saved many man hours that were involved with the letting of approximately fifteen (15) individual marine repair contracts.

(f) Item: On board repair parts for picket boats show signs of deterioration and a lack of supply control.

1. DISCUSSION: An inspection of the 36 foot and 46 foot picket boats assigned to this command revealed a large quantity of items which were deteriorating before they could be used. Picket boats of the aforementioned size are limited in their storage area and some items, notably filters and gaskets, are authorized in large quantities. In some cases repair parts were available aboard one craft that were required aboard another. Due to a lack of inventoried listings aboard each craft, the fact that they were available went unnoticed.

2. OBSERVATION: On board repair parts for 36 foot and 46 foot picket boats have been stored in the Vessel Supply Office. This does:

a. Provide a sheltered location to protect repair parts from exposure.

b. Provide a controlled means of replenishing supplies and parts as they are issued.

c. Provide one central source where a maximum number of parts would be available for all craft.

(g) Item: Analysis of present supply procedures indicate that

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lead time can be shorter through the utilization of a C-12 priority on requisitions submitted by this command.

1. DISCUSSION: Current supply procedures existing at this headquarters using a C-05 priority on requisitions have produced a longer lead time in procuring a needed item than utilizing a C-12 priority. It appears that current assets at Support Command have reached a level whereby they can supply certain items upon demand. Normal restockage level of certain items for CSA appears to be below the time required to process a C-05 priority or higher through 2d Logistical Command. It has also been found on several occasions that a substitute item is available from depot stocks and can be issued to the user under a C-12 priority.

2. OBSERVATION: Present supply procedures at this command have been reevaluated so as to insure that the present system is not compromised by using a higher priority.

(h) Item: Although not authorized teletypewriter equipment, the Y-100 POL tanker operated by the 380th Transportation Detachment, has experienced a need for this equipment.

1. DISCUSSION: The Y-100 tanker operates along the coast of Vietnam supplying fuel requirements. It is dependent on weather information furnished by Navy weather reports. This information is transmitted at a rate of 21 words per minute which is faster than the qualifications of Army trained operators. A teletypewriter would serve the purpose of receiving this information.


2. OBSERVATION: A USARV Form 47 is being prepared and forwarded to authorize this piece of equipment on board the Y-100. This equipment is desireable on all large vessels operating at sea for extended periods of time.

b. Part II - Recommendations: None

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as

JACK C. FUSON  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND  
APO US Forces 96307

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 81

10 May 1966

TC O19. Fol units REASSIGNED as indic. NTI.

62D TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Mdm Trk)  
120TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Lt Trk)  
163D TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Lt Trk)  
534TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Mdm Trk)  
556TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Mdm Trk) (Petr1)  
670TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Mdm Trk) (Comp)

Rel fr: 4th Transportation Company (Tml A)

Asg to: Support Command A

Eff date: 12 May 1966

Auth: NA

Sp instr: None

48TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP, HHD

Asg to: 1st Log Comd; further asg to Support Command A

Eff date: 6 May 1966 VOOG

Auth: NA

Sp instr: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:


PAUL A. TROUP, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

s/C.C. Rice  
t/C.C. RICE  
Major, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

10-ea Unit conc  
10-CO, Spt Comd A  
10-CO, 4th TC Comd  
10-AcOfS, SP&O  
2-ea Dir/Staff element  
1-Record file  
1-Reference file  
1-AG-PM

INCL #2



Incl #3

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC  
APO San Francisco 96558

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 149

30 June 1966

REORGANIZATION

1. TC Oll. Following Organization/Unit REORGANIZED.

UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM Unit listed in Inclosure 1.

Effective date: 1 July 1966

Equipment: Required and not available will be requisitioned in accordance with normal supply procedures; equipment rendered excess will be disposed of in accordance with current procedures.

Personnel: Maximum number of personnel required by this action will be assigned from locally available resources without MPA-PCS costs; remainder will be procured through application of normal requisitioning procedures. New enlisted personnel authorizations will be reflected immediately in the OPO-45 Report.

Files/records: Will be continued without cutoff in accordance with AR 345-210 or AR 345-215 as applicable.

Morning report: Entry will be made in record of events section in accordance with AR 335-60.

Authority: DA message 771801, 29 June 1966.

Account classification: Obligate to the extent necessary the appropriate allotments in accordance with current fiscal procedures.

Special instructions: MTOE reflecting the approved organization for this unit will be submitted in accordance with AR 310-31.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

EDGAR C. DOLEMAN  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chief of Staff

/s/ A. L. RANSOME  
/t/ A. L. RANSOME  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

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A TRUE COPY:

Omer E. Pigeon /  
OMER E. PIGEON, JR.  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant

(GO 149, HQ USARPAC, 1966)

Force #4

15

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>				<u>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</u>		
<u>TPSN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>HQ</u>	<u>EXL</u>	<u>AGC</u>
35507	HHC, 4th Trans Comd (Tml) UIC: WCJ1 TO	55-111D, 59 w/c 6 (TOE 300-30) (SRC 55 111D 9001)	94	210	304	


A TRUE COPY:

*Omer E. Pigeon Jr.*

OMER E. PIGEON, JR.  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant

Inclosure 1 to GO 149, HQ USARPAC, 1966

4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND



Incl #5

## OPORD 2-66 (Operation Moonlight)

## REFERENCES:

- a. Maps: South Vietnam Series Lt01; 1:50,000 sheets CR 6852-III-IV, BR 6752-I-IV, AR 6652 I, IV, CP 6846IV.
- b. Opord 1-66 (Operation Moonlight) (U) Hq, USARV, APO San Francisco 96307, 9 Feb 66.
- c. OPLAN 1-66 (Operation Moonlight) (U) Hq, 1st Logistical Command, Tan Son Nhut, (XS 820958) SVN Feb 1966 with change, dated 260900Z Feb 1966.

## Task Organization:

11th Trans Bn (Tml)  
SAT Port Plans Div  
SAT Port Operation Div  
SAT Port Transportation Div  
SAT Supply Services and Maintenance Div

## 1. (S) SITUATION:

## a. Enemy Forces: omitted

## b. Friendly Forces:

(1) COMUSMACV, receives, debarks, and processes the 25th Inf Div (-) and associated non-divisional units through ports of debarkation and deploys these units to designated assembly areas.

(2) Commander, 2d Air Div, USAF, provides necessary airlift to move personnel from Vung Tau (VS 2844) to Tan Son Nhut (XS 8195) or Bien Hoa (XT 9813).

(3) CG, 1st Inf Div provides security for movement to assembly area from Tan Son Nhut Air Base; secures staging area to assembly areas; secures assembly areas during initial occupation and development; submits real estate requirement to CG, USARV.

(4) SA CMR, requests assistance of CG, CMR in providing security for Saigon port area and along routes of deployment through CMR as requested by CG, USARV and 1st Inf Div.

(5) US Army Support Command, Vung Tau (Prov) provides water and emergency logistical support during debarkation; through TMA requests airlift for passengers from Vung Tau to Tan Son Nhut airfield and Bien Hoa airfield; and provides command and control center in the port of Vung Tau.

(6) US Army Support Command, Saigon (USASC) provides logistical support; establishes and operates Moonlight Command and Control Center at Tan Son Nhut, and staging area vic XT 9702; provides roadside and dockside maintenance during debarkation, obtains road clearance on routes requested by 4th Trans Comd; and coordinates security of convoys.

(7) 58th Medical Battalion provides emergency medical treatment and ground evacuation.

(8) 43rd Med Group provides emergency air evacuation.

## c. Attachments and Detachments: none

2. (S) MISSION: 4th Trans Comd debarks and processes the 25th Inf Div (-) through the ports of Vung Tau and Saigon, selects routes from Saigon Port to the assembly area; provides ground transportation support; and provides MHE support in the staging and assembly area.

3. (S) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations: The 25th Inf Div (-) will arrive in RVN in three phases during the period 15 Feb 66 to 30 April 66.

(1) Phase I - Increment A: One Tank company arrives Qui Nhon between 15 Feb and 1 Mar 66, unit is staged and moves to Pleiku; increment B; 1/69 Bn (-) (Tank Battalion) arrives Saigon between 1 Mar 66 and 15 Mar 66, unit is staged and moves vic Cu Chi.

(2) Phase II - Division headquarters and units from the division base arrive through Vung Tau (personnel) and Saigon (equipment). Personnel will be flown to Tan Son Nhut and trucked from there to Cu Chi. Phase II lasts from 15 Mar 66 to 15 Apr 66.

(3) Phase III - 1st Brigade, 25th Inf Div arrives at Vung Tau (personnel) and Saigon (equipment). Personnel will be flown to Bien Hoa and trucked to staging area. After the marrying up process, unit will move to positions vicinity Cu Chi.

(4) Phase I personnel and equipment of the tank battalion (-) will move through the port of Saigon. Personnel will be transported to Tent City B. Equipment will be transported to 1st Log TMP vic route 1 and Nguyen-Van Thoai Street. Personnel and equipment then move to the assembly area vic Cu Chi by company.

(5) Phase II - Debarkation

(a) Category 1 (Personnel) - Personnel and yellow disc TAT will be discharged from ships at Vung Tau and transported by aircraft to Tan Son Nhut. Truck transport will be utilized in convoying personnel and yellow disc TAT from Tan Son Nhut to Cu Chi. Red disc TAT on passenger vessels will be loaded on LST's at Vung Tau and transported to Saigon for discharge and further movement to Cu Chi by vehicle.

(b) Category 2 (Vehicles)-Wheeled vehicles will be discharged, activated, formed into convoys and driven to Cu Chi by 25th Inf Div personnel. Tracked vehicles will be discharged into LCM'8's, moved to the Vietnamese Navy Shipyard, unloaded, activated, and moved in convoy to 1st Log TMP by 25th Inf Div personnel during curfew hours.

(c) Category 3 (Cargo) - Cargo will be discharged in Saigon Port and then moved to Cu Chi by 25th Inf Div vehicles and/or supporting vehicles.

(6) Phase III - Personnel, vehicles and cargo debarkation and movement will be the same as Phase II except that personnel and yellow disc TAT will be airlifted to Bien Hoa airfield instead of Tan Son Nhut airfield.

b. 11th Trans Bn (Tml)

(1) Select highway routes from the port of Saigon to Route 1 (Phase I), Saigon Port and Tan Son Nhut to assembly area (Phase II), Saigon Port to staging area vicinity Long Bien (Phase III), and Bien Hoa airfield to staging area (Phase III).

(2) Coordinate with US Army Support Command, Saigon for route clearance.

(3) Provide truck transportation as directed by Port Transportation Division.

(4) Provide convoy control personnel.

(5) Provide rough terrain forklifts as required in staging area and Cu Chi.

## c. Port Trans Division

- (1) Determine highway transportation requirements under each phase (to include Vung Tau).
- (2) Request transportation from 11th Trans Bn (Tml).
- (3) Provide 4th Trans Comd representation in the Moonlight Command and Control Center in Phase I, II, & III. Establish briefing capability in each center.
- (4) Provide representatives to control center in port of Saigon.
- (5) Arrange for the return of drivers from assembly area and/or staging area to port for movement of organic vehicles.
- (6) Maintain liaison with 25th Inf Div, 1st Log Comd, and USASC, Saigon.
- (7) In coordination with Provost Marshal SAT, develop traffic circulation and control plan for all areas.

## d. Port Operations Division

- (1) Maintains liaison with MSTS and 25th Inf Div to determine estimated time of arrival of vessels.
- (2) Maintain current status of vessel discharge and cargo staging.
- (3) Coordinate with Port Trans Div to insure rapid port clearance of unit vehicles and cargo.
- (4) Designate vehicle and cargo staging area within Saigon Port as required.
- (5) Establish and operate Saigon Port Control Center to include briefing capability. Control center will be operational on a 24 hour basis.
- (6) Determine lighterage requirements at Vung Tau and Saigon.
- (7) Provide representation in the Vung Tau control center in Phase II and III.
- (8) Submit daily report to 1st Log Comd Moonlight Command and Control Center by phone. Report rendered NLT 2400 hours as of 1800 hours. Negative reports not required.

Line Alpha: ATA and harbor location of each ship by name.

Line Bravo: Actual time loading commenced on each ship.

Line Charlie: Actual time unloading completed on each ship.

Line Delta: Total PAX debarked from each ship during the reporting period.

Line Echo: Total major items by type of equipment unloaded from each ship during the reporting period.

Line Foxtrot: Total short tons of general cargo unloaded from each ship during the reporting period.

OPORD 2-66 (Operation Moonlight<sup>1</sup>(U), HQ, 4TH TRANS COMD

e. Supply Services and Maintenance Div

(1) Provide operators and maintenance support for MHE in Vessel Discharge area.

(2) Coordinate with Saigon Logistics Area and 25th Inf Div to insure emergency rations are available for unit drivers moving vehicles from port.

(3) Establish communications system to include Moonlight Control Center and 11th Trans Bn (Tml).

f. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Port Plans Div, SAT is coordinating agency for 4th Trans Comd.

(2) Project Officers: Subject to change.

(a) Port Plans Div - Capt Pugh - Saigon Port 121/238

(b) Port Trans Div - Major Coen - Saigon Port 261/193

(c) Supply Services and Maint - Capt Kelly - Saigon Port 119

(d) 11th Trans Bn - Major Wright - Long Bien 349

(3) Moonlight Command and Control Centers

Phase I - Tent City "B", Saigon

Phase II - Tan Son Nhut airfield

Phase III - Staging area vic Long Binh

(4) Each division maintains reports and statistics for after action report. Format to be published.

(5) Operation Time Frame Summary (Subject to change)

Phase I; 1st Bn 69th Armor

Unit Readiness Date: 28 Feb 66

Unit Embarc Date: 28 Feb - 1 Mar 66

ETA RVN: 8-11 Mar 66

Increment A - Naha, Okinawa to Qui Nhon.

PAX	TOTAL L/T	TOTAL M/T	TRACK	WHEEL	TRC	GEN CARGO
C Co 104	980	1728	19	9	5	Unk
Increment B - Naha, Okinawa to Saigon						
Hq Co 312	1262	4297	36	109	21	172 L/T
A Co 104	980	1728	19	9	5	Unk
B Co 104	980	1728	19	9	5	Unk
TOT	520	2222	74	127	31	Unk

## Phase II: Hq, 25th Inf Div (-)

<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>ETA: VUNG TAU</u>
1480	23,013	USNS POPE	12 Mar
1907	39,581	USNS GORDON	31 Mar

## Phase III: 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div

<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>ETA: VUNG TAU</u>
3186	Unk	USNS WALKER	16 Apr

4. (U) Administration and Logistics: Omitted.

5. (S) Command and Signal

a. Signal

Current USARV SOI and SSI in effect.

b. Command

4th Trans Comd CP vic Le Lai Hotel.

## ACKNOWLEDGE

ARONSON  
COL

## DISTRIBUTION:

1-Rec  
 1-Ref  
 1-CO  
 1-Deputy SAT  
 1-XO  
 5-CO, 11th Trans Bn (Tml)  
 5-Port Trans Div, SAT  
 5-Port Ops Div, SAT  
 2-Port Plans Div, SAT  
 2-Supply Services and Maint Div, SAT  
 5-CO, 1st Log Comd  
 2-CO, SLA  
 1-CO, 89th MP Grp  
 2-CG, 1st Inf Div  
 5-CG, 25th Inf Div

## OFFICIAL

s/Oliver  
 t/OLIVER  
 DEP, SAT

22

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
APO 96307

AVLC TA-PP

23 May 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Moonlight (U)

TO: Commanding General  
1st Logistical Command  
ATTN: AVLC GO-O  
'PO US Forces 96307

1. Reference:

- a. FOUO letter, Hq, 1st Log Comd, subject as above, dtd 8 Mar 66.
- b. Letter, Hq, 1st Log Comd, subject as above, dtd 25 Apr 66.

2. Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command in support of operation Moonlight:

- a. Port Plans Division: Overall planning and coordination of activities to include publication of 4th Trans Comd OPORD.
  - b. Port Operations Division: Actual discharge of vessels, pier management and intransit storage.
  - c. Port Transportation Division: General transportation support of port clearance, troop movement and administration.
  - d. Support Services and Maintenance Division: Signal and logistical support.
  - e. Hq, 11th Transportation Battalion: Vehicular and MHE support.
3. Vung Tau sub-port operations: Troops and TAT equipment of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Division Artillery, Support Command and units of the division base were discharged over the beach during the period 13 Mar 66 to 1 May 66.

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>TAT</u>
USNS WALKER	1 - 3 Apr	1,194	238 S/T
USNS GORDON	1 - 3 Apr	2,151	275 S/T
USNS WALKER	29 Apr - 1 May	3,193	347 S/T

Incl #7

23

AVLC-TA-PP

23 May 66

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Moonlight (U)

a. Troops were debarked from the ship to a barge secured alongside and then transported by landing craft to the LST beach at Vung Tau. Troops and baggage were moved to the airstrip in 2½ ton trucks and flown to Tan Son Nhut Airbase in USAF C-130s. During Phase I and II, personnel were airlifted from TSN to Cu Chi in CH-47 helicopters. This was not done in Phase III because the helicopters were unavailable. Movement during this phase was accomplished by 2½ ton trucks in convoy and under escort.

b. TAT equipment and cargo was segregated at Vung Tau. Yellow disc was airlifted to Tan Son Nhut for further movement to Cu Chi. Red circle cargo moved by LST to Saigon for highway transshipment to Cu Chi.

4. Saigon port operations: The bulk of the division's cargo and equipment was discharged and cleared through Saigon Port. Inclosure one (1) reflects the tonnage data for all phases of the operation. Communications, co-ordination and briefings were handled by the control center established on the pier.

a. Phase I: Cargo vessels were berthed at KO-1. LST's discharged vehicles at beach "G", located in the RVN Navy yard, then shifted to MM3 to complete cargo discharge.

b. Phase II and III cargo vessels were discharged at MM2 and staged on the pier or in adjacent warehouses.

c. Vehicular cargo, general cargo and equipment were moved under MP escort through Saigon to the staging area at 1st Log TMP. From the TMP, the convoys were reorganized for further movement to Cu Chi.

d. Highway and port clearance data are reflected in inclosure two (2).

#### 5. Recommendations:

a. Maximum planned (programmed) use should be made of the CH-47 or similar helicopter in future moves of this type. Employment of helicopters greatly reduces vehicle requirements and provides a fast, secure and completely effective means of transport.

b. It is of the utmost importance that any operation involving the commitment of large amounts of truck transportation also include sufficient MHE and adequate maintenance support. This problem has occurred in every operation. If it is determined that MHE of the type and quantity necessary to meet field discharge requirements will not be available, then plans for future moves will have to include a discharge and port clearance plan geared to the unit's capability to receive and offload the shipments. This may involve extending a vessel's discharge time, delaying the call forward of ships at Cape St Jacques or any method which will permit port clearance and unit discharge to equalize.

AVLC TA-PP

23 May 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Moonlight (U)

6. General: No significant problems were encountered during the course of the operation. Experience gained and precedents established from previous operations of this type proved invaluable. Very few situations arose which had not been anticipated. Bad weather, however, limited the offloading capability at Cu Chi. The M&M facilities will be used whenever possible to accomodate future moves. This area provides the best staging, warehousing and security available in the Saigon Port.

7. Conclusion: Operation Moonlight was highly successful in all areas. This success can be attributed to the close coordination and prior planning between all agencies and commands involved with the movement of the 25th Infantry Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls  
as

s/Cleo C. Garrett  
t/CLEO C. GARRETT  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant

## VESSEL DISCHARGE INFORMATION - PORT OF SAIGON

<u>PHASE I</u> <u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DISCHARGED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>WHEEL VEH</u>	<u>TRACK</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PAX</u>		
	<u>START</u> (March)	<u>FINISHED</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT TONS</u>	<u>TRK/TIR</u>	<u>VEH</u>		
Tioga Country	060727	080830	1101	2,486	29/13	22	—	169
Windham Country	050757	090855	926	2,297	19/12	24	—	150
LST 491	111555	130445	653	1,128	11/ 4	13	—	28
IST 626	121105	141000	612	1,104	11/ 4	14	—	31
Solon Thurman	151805	170300	2450	7,935	125/118	15	—	5
Adabelle Lykes	171454	190545	2500	8,544	181/118	—	—	4
LST 1157	221730	251600	4870	476/13	88	—	—	387

## VESSEL DISCHARGE INFORMATION - PORT OF SAIGON

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>DISCHARGED STAMP NUMBER</u>	<u>TOTAL SHORT TONS</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT TONS</u>	<u>TRAILER VEH</u>	<u>WHEEL, VEH TRACK</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TOTAL PAK</u>
							<u>PAK</u>
U.S. Tourist	021615 040845	2,299		7,320	148/85	—	3
Loma Victory	041530 050745	1,838		6,650	106/94	—	—
LST 222	051845 052030	TAT 275		683	—	—	—
Meridian Victory	062000 090745	2,437		7,494	68/71 3	—	—
Catawba Victory	091430 100340	2,335		6,849	106/62 7	2	—
American Chief	11180 151800	3,676		9,395	99/66 12	—	—
LST 1165	141330 150200	TAT 60		180	—	—	—
East Hills	191550 211030 (May)	1,900		6,459	82/71	—	—
African Glenn	081125 090345	202		1,042	27/20	—	—
<u>PHASE III</u>							
Thunderbird	021500 031400	1,438		5,446	148/138 2	—	—
Trans Caribbean	031635 050230	1,541		5,978	166/127	—	—
•nika	051645 080600	2,203		6,002	137/116	2	—
AB&T Barge	302120 010440	TAT 202		374	—	—	—
US Army Barge	012330 020650	145		255	—	—	—

Inclosure #1, Page 2 of 2 Pages

PORT CLEARANCE DATA

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONNAGE CLEARED</u>
Mar	242	4,032 S/T
Apr	542	6,251 S/T
*May	321	3,718 S/T

\* Utilization and tonnage figures as of 19 May. Approximately 800 S/T of Moonlight cargo remain to be cleared.

Inclosure #2

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

AVNGC-DH (18 August 1966)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSPOB-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 11 NOV '66

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned from the 4th Transportation Command as indorsed and adds the following comments.

2. Reference Section 2, Part I:

a. Paragraph a(1)(a), Page 4: The instruction on MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP (Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures and Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures) will be conducted within the command as required.

b. Paragraph a(1)(b), Page 4: It is the responsibility of the supervisor under whom the MHE (Materials Handling Equipment) operators work, to test them prior to acceptance and final hire. The Central Training Institute, Office of the Civilian Personnel Director has to date trained 82 local national forklift operators. Failure to report to work and sleeping on the job indicate better supervision and better testing and interview procedures are needed. Additional guidance and assistance in remedying this situation will be provided by this headquarters as required.

c. Paragraph a(2)(b), Page 5: Nonconcur. RO/RO (Roll on/Roll off) trailers are used only between Okinawa and Vietnam. Highly pilferable supplies are for the most part shipped directly from CONUS to Vietnam. It is not feasible to direct vessels into Okinawa in order to transload into RO/RO trailers.

d. Paragraph a(2)(c), Page 5: Responsibility for documentation of cargo loaded on barges and LCU's (Landing Craft Utility) is that of the loading terminal. Therefore, vessels loaded in Vung Tau, Saigon, Long Binh complex will be documented by the appropriate operating unit under the command of the 4th Transportation Command. If the discrepancies occur on intra-Vietnam movement, responsibility rests with the 1st Logistical Command and appropriate corrective action will be taken.

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GPOP-OT(18 Aug 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 9 DEC 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl  
nc

*G. L. McMullin*  
G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVNGC-DH (18 August 1966)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

e. Paragraph a(4)(a), Page 8: A modification to TOE 55-128E (Saigon Security Boat Company) requesting additional boats, crews and maintenance personnel was forwarded to CINUSARPAC in August 1966. Information was received from DA in October 1966 that the type boat requested was not available and substitute craft would be provided if desired. A decision on the acceptability of the substitute craft is expected by 15 November 1966. Military police corps personnel will provide security aboard the craft selected.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. R. AUTRY  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl  
mc